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March 24, 1969 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (n., MOJI.TTANA) 
ABM: The Focus of the Proposal 
As the Senate begins its evaluation, the features of President 
Nixon's new proposal for the ABM system ought to be seen in proper focus. 
It was evident from the press conference on March 14, for example, that 
the President's basic dec is ion changed the earlier concept of the ABM 
system. Last year the ABM was billed as affording protection primarily 
to the cities against a Chinese attack and onlv incidentally, as safeguard-
ing emplaced ICBM missile-sites in rural areas. This year the President 
proposes to shift the emphasis of protection 180 degrees, from the cities 
to the rural ICBM-sites. This change was explicit in the President's press 
conference and it was clear in the presentation to the Congressional leaders 
at the 1Vhi te House prior to the press conference. 
Since then, other briefings have been provided to amplif;r the 
President's decision. These subsequent statements by the officials of 
the Defense Department seem to me to be confusing the emphasis which the 
President had set forth in his new approach. 
President Nixon's proposal was to limit the actual deployment 
of the ABM system at this point to missile farms in Montana and North 
Dakota. Indeed, it was evident that he was hopeful that negotiations 
with the Soviet Union might make even the completion of this limited 
deployment unnecessary. The President specifically reserved until a 
later review any decision for elaboration of the proposed system be~rond 
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the initial two-site installation. The President put off, until this 
future review, any extension of the system--vrhether to provide for a 
"thin" coverage against Chinese attacks or to counter an accidental 
missile firing from abroad which might destroy one or more cities. 
Insofar as protection of people against a massive Soviet first-strike, 
that was rejected outright by President Nixon as it had been rejected by 
the previous Administration. 
Such was the emphasis given by the President in his new approach. 
Defense Department interpretations have tended to obfuscate, it seems to me, 
the restraint which characterized the President's decision. These subse-
quent statements leave the strong impression that t he two-site installations 
are just the beginning of a vas·t program to convert the entire nation into 
a missile Maginot. It is as if future revievs of the int ernational situa-
tion which the President has stressed he would make prior to any further 
elaboration of the system Ifill be nothing more than some sort of charade 
for the benefit of those vho have had grave concern about the entire enter-
prise from the outset. 
As a courtesy to the President, I have endeavored to keep an 
open mind on the new approach. The Senate knows that I have opposed the 
original ABM proposal in the past, not only during the first few days of 
the Nixon Administration, but also throughout the closin~ years of the 
Johnson Administration. For me, there is not now and there has never been 
any partisanship in this issue. As I have opposed the Sentinel program 
during two admin1strations of different politicalleadershl..p, it has been 
opposed in the same fashion by other Members on both sides of the aisle. 
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In this connection, I would refer to the leadership of the distinguished 
Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cooper) and the contributions of other Repub-
lican Senators. 
To infer part isanship where none exists does a disservice to the 
Senate and to the count ry. Before judgment on this issue is taken , all 
Senat ors will insist, as I will insist, upon the most thorough discussion . 
We are deciding here not for a day but for years and, perhaps, decades. 
vlho doubts that Senators will not form their conclusions on the basis of 
understanding and conviction rather than on the basis of party considera-
tions? Members of t he SenA t e would be well advised to put aside talk of 
partisanship. There is no partisanship and I would hope and expect that 
there will be no pettiness with respect to this critical issue . 
It would be my hope , too, that subordinates in the Administration 
will not read into the President's decision their own preconceptions and 
predilections. The President has made clear tha t he has not gone beyond 
a fixed point of decision and he will not go beyond it without subsequent 
review of the shifting nature of securit y needs. His subordinates in t he 
Defense Department --whet her political or bureaucratic--ought to be the 
firs t to hear and heed him. vlhen he says t hat he will decide not now but 
in the future, whether the situation at t hat time justifies curtailment, 
expansion or any ot her modification of the initial deployment, he should 
be taken at his word. 
It should b e borne in mind, too, that we are in a most difficult 
period in Viet Nam and at home. We are in a time of growing financial 
s t ress among the tax-squeezed , inflation-pressed people of t his nation. 
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It is of the utmost importance tha-~ there not be lost any opportunity to 
bring under control the immense and growing cost of armaments to this nation. 
Negotiations with the Soviet Union, which the President has made clear he 
intends to pursue, might conceivably act to curb those costs. 
Frankly, I do not know whether agreements can be achieved with 
our principal rival in this wasteful military competition. I do not believe, 
however, that it enhances the prospects for agreement whel:l non-elected 
officials of this government play one-upmanship with limited Presidential 
decisions. Nor does it strengthen the prospects for agreement if the 
rationale which is set forth in order to justify deployment of the ABM 
gives the appearance of a missile system in search of a mission. That has 
been the effect of the flailing efforts to push this sy;stem through the 
Congress over the past several years. The country has been saturated with 
a propaganda that has not only puzzled our own people but which may well 
have exposed the nation to international ridicule. First, it was urged 
that the Sentinel system be adopted on the grounds that it would protect 
Americans against the Russians. ThenJ when it was t ransparent that nothing 
could protect the people of the nation against massive Soviet attack, the 
system was labeled a defense of the inhabitants of the cities --a thin 
defense--against the irrational Chinese. Finally, it was termed a defense 
against both the Russians and the Chinese and even against accidental 
missile firings. Indeed, is it any wonder that there are grave doubts, 
now, as to whether an ABM system can protect this nation against anyone? 
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That is another point, however, and I will take it up at another 
time. I wish to stress now that the system which President Nixon has 
proposed be built this year is for the protection of a segment of a segment 
of our deterrent power--350 Minuteman missi l es in Montana and North Dakota. 
That is not a protection against Chinaj it is a protection of a small part 
of our capacity to retaliate against an attack from the S~iet Union. By 
the same token, therefore, it is with Russia that disarmament agreements 
which might make possible the forestalling of the immensely costly place-
ment of the ABM's might have relevance. If, instead what is proposed for 
this year is to cement in a plan for a mixed system--a polyglot ABM--to 
protect all of t he ICBM deterrent power of the United States, to protect 
against China, to protect against third parties or to protect against 
accidental attacks or to protect against whatever, then what sense would 
it make, as it is obviously contemplated, to talk disarmament with the 
Russians but not with the Chinese? Do you disarm a defense system against 
China or against accidental missiles because you have negotiated an arms 
agreement with the Soviet Union? 
\{hat I am suggesting, Mr. President, is that it is at least possible 
to find a rationale in the association of a two -site ABM installation and 
negotiations with the Russians on arms limitation. President Nixon linked 
these two considerations in shifting from the previous ABM concept. I fear, 
however, that subsequent interpretation by his subordinates is rapidly 
dismantling the connection. To be sure, there is a certain ritual deference 
paid to the disarmament aspect of the President ' s approach but any perusal of 
the record to date will show that the emphasis has clearly shifted so that the 
two-site installations appear to be coming into focus as a mere wayside stop 
along the road to the construction of a great nuclear wall whose costs would 
be incalculable. 
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It seems to me, therefore, that we need to know whether the pre-
sumption upon which the Defense Department now seems to be acting is valid--
that is, that an open-eDded deployment of an area defense system aimed in 
any and all directions is a foregone conclusion. I thought the President 
had not decided that point--that he had decided at this time only to deploy 
AEM's at two sites. I thought the President was trying to keep open an 
option which would permit him to restrain the costly spread of the system 
at that point or even to reverse it. The interpretations seem to me, however, 
to be closing off that option. How are we to explain, otherwise, the effort 
which is being made by the Defense Department to obtain appropriations from 
the Senate, for example, to purchase, this year, land for several ABM sites 
beyond those in Montana and North Dakota? These purchases would have no 
purpose other than to set in motion an elaboration which President Nixon 
presumably has not yet decided. vJhat justification can there be for appro-
priating this year for a need which may not exist next year? Indeed, the 
Department's request for this money seems to me presumptuous of the intent 
of both the President and the Congress. 
The basic focus of this discussion on the ABM, then, if I may sum 
up, ought to be on what President Nixon has proposed to begin to do this 
year: that is, to provide ABM's to protect 350 Minuteman ICBM missiles in 
Montana and North Dakota while trying to move ahead, at the same time, with 
the 
negotiations with/Russians on curbing the armaments-competition. Whether 
even that limited ABM deployment is justified is another matter. That will 
have to be considered in the light of the reliability, redundance and the 
relevance of any ABM deployment at this time. It will have to be discussed 
in the light of the immense costs, actual and potential. It will have to 
be decided, finally, on the basis of the need to balance the requirements 
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of external security against the re~uirements for halting the disintegration 
of the nation's internal security in all of its ramifications . 
I shall have more to say on this subject, Mr. President, at a 
subsequent date. 
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e.ru1 war. We owe ounclveo~, we owe the ru-
ture, a heavy obllga.t1on to tcy. 
ABM: THE FOCUS OF THE 
PROPOSAL 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a.s 
the Senate begins its evaluation of the 
ABM system, the features of President 
Nixon's new proposal for this system 
ought to be seen in proper focus. 
May I say that I make this speech 
today with due respect to the dimculties 
which confronted the President of the 
United States when he thought about a 
drastic changeover in the configuration 
of the Safeguard system from what had 
previously been known as the Sentinel 
system, which he had inherited from a 
Democratic administration. 
May I say, also, that I appreciated the 
!rankne.ss with which the President of 
the United States discussed this matter 
with the joint leadership on the day he 
also later discussed it with the people of 
America by means of a TV broadcast, at 
which time he outlined his views and 
gave his reasons and opened hl.m.self up 
to questions on the part of the commu-
nications media. 
At that meeting, when the President 
told us of the decision, he asked for our 
reaction. I must admit, In all candor, 
that the reaction among those present 
was aimost unanimously in support of 
what he had stated he was going to do. 
But, with equal candor, I must say that 
one or two of us expressed our doubts 
and stated that we had serious questions 
relative to cost, rellabllity, alternatives, 
need, and other factors. He understood 
perfectly that this was a matter which 
could be from two, if not more, sides, 
and he stated that he did not call the 
leadership down to fonn a cheerleaders' 
section to get behind him, but to tell us 
his views and, in return, to get our 
reaction. 
The President had a most d.l.ftl.cult de-
cision to face up to. I give him great 
credit for being responsible-solely re-
sponsible-for the review which he re-
quested on the Sentinel system. I give 
him credit--;!'reat credit-for facing up 
to his responsibility as President of the 
United States and arriving at a decision. 
I have no doubt in my mind that his 
decision was based on what he consid-
ered to be in the best interests of the 
Nation as a whole. 
I did not attend the meetings at which 
the Secretary of Defense and his ad-
visers--Under Secretary Packard, Gen-
eral Wheeler, and Dr. Foster- appeared 
before the appropriate committees; but 
I did read the newspaper accounts with 
· a great deal of interest, and I also hap-
pened to be lucky enough to view certain 
portions of their appearance before the 
Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations. 
I want to give Secretary Laird great 
credit, also, for the way he presented his 
case, for the vigor he showed in marshal-
ing his facts and in answering the variety 
of questions which were directed to him 
from all directions. 
But I do think, Mr. President, that this 
matter should be viewed in proper focus, 
a nd I anticipate that the Safeguard anti-
ballist ic-missile system will be the sub-
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ject of thoroughgoing and extended 
debate In t.uo body. 
It was evident !rom the press con-
ference on March 14, for example, that 
the President's basic decision changed 
the earlier concept of the ABM system. 
Last year the ABM was billed as afford-
Ing protection primarily to the cities 
against a Chinese attack and only in-
cidentally as safeguarding emplaced 
ICBM missile sites in rural areas. This 
year the President proposes to shift the 
emphasis of protection 180 degrees, from 
the clUes to the rural ICBM sites. This 
change was explicit in the President's 
press conference, and it was clear in the 
presentation to the congressional leaders 
at the White House prior to the press 
conference. 
Since then, other briefings have been 
provided to amplify the President's de-
cision. These subsequent statements by 
the officials of the Defense Department 
seem to me to be confusing the emphasis 
which the President had set forth in his 
new approach. 
President Nixon's proposal was to limit 
the actual deployment of the ABM sys-
tem at this point to missile farms In 
Montana and North Dakota. Indeed, It 
was evident that he was hopeful that 
negotiations with the Soviet Union might 
make even the completion of this llm1ted 
deployment unnecessary. The President 
specifically reserved until a. later review 
any decision for elaboration of the pro-
posed system beyond the initial two-site 
installation. The President put off, until 
this future review, any extension of the 
system-whether to provide for a "thin" 
coverage against Chinese attacks or to 
counter an accidental missile firing from 
abroad which might destroy one or more 
cities. Insofar as protection of people 
against a massive Soviet first strike, that 
was rejected outright by President Nixon, 
as It had been rejected by the previous 
administration. 
Such was the emphasis given by the 
President in his new approach. Defense 
Department interpretations h«Ve tended 
to obfuscate, it seems to me, the restraint 
which characterized the President's deci-
sion. These subsequent statements leave 
the strong impression that the two-site 
installations are just the beginning of a 
vast program to convert the entire Na-
tion into a missile mag!not. It is as if 
future reviews o! the international situ-
ation which the President has stressed 
he would make prior to any further 
elaboration of the system will be nothing 
more than some sort o! charade for the 
benefit of those who have had grave con-
cern about the entire enterprise !rom the 
outset. 
As a courtesy to the President, I have 
endeavored to keep an open mind on the 
new approach. The Senate knows that 
I have opposed the original ABM propo-
sal in the past, not only during the first 
fC'w days of the Nixon administration, 
but also throughout the closing years of 
the Johnson administration. For me, 
there Is not now and there has never been 
any partisanship in this if.sue. As I have 
opposed the Sentinel program during 
two administrations of different political 
leadership, it has been opposed in the 
same fashion by other Members on both 
sides of the aisle. In this connection, I 
would refer to the leadership of the di.s-
t!ngul.shed Senator from Kentucky <Mr. 
CoOPER) and the contributions of other 
Republican Senators. 
To infer partisanship where none exists 
does a disservice to the Senate and to 
the country. Before judgment on this 
issue is taken, all Senators will insist, 
as I will insist, upon the most thorough 
discussion. We are deciding here not for 
a day but for years and, perhaps, dec-
ades. Who doubts that Senators will not 
form their conclusions on the basis of 
understanding and conviction rather 
than on the basis of party considera-
tions? Members of the Senate would be 
well advised to put aside talk of partisan-
ship. There is no partisanship and I 
would hope and expect that there will be 
no pettiness with respect to this critical 
issue. 
It would be roy hope, too, that sub-
ordinates in the administration will not 
read into the President's decision their 
own preconceptions and predilections. 
The President has made clear that he 
has not gone beyond a fixetl point of de-
cision and he will not go beyond it with-
out subsequent review of the shifting 
nature of security needs. His subordi-
nates in the Defense Department-
whether political or bureaucratic-ought 
to be the first to hear and heed him. 
When he says that he will decide not now 
but in the future, whether the situation 
at that time justifies curtailment, ex-
pansion or any other modification of the 
initial deployment, he should be taken 
at his word. 
It should be borne in mind, too, that 
we are in a most di.ffi.cult period in Viet-
nam and at home. We are in a time of 
growing financial stress among the tax-
squeezed, inflation-pressed people of this 
Nation. 
It is of the utmost Importance that 
there not be lost any opportunity to 
bring under control the immense and 
growing cost of armaments to this Na-
tion. Negotiations with-the Soviet Union, 
which the President has made clear he 
intends to pursue, might conceivably act 
to curb those costs. 
Frankly, I do not know whether agree-
menta can be achieved with our princi-
pal rival in this wasteful military com-
petition. I do not believe, however, that 
it enhances the propects for agreement 
when nonelected officials of this Govern-
ment play one-upmanship with l!m1ted 
presidential decisions. Nor does it 
strengthen the pros~cts for agreement 
if the rationale which Is set forth in order 
to justify deployment of the ABM gives 
the appearance of a missile system in 
search of a m1sslon, to quote the words 
of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. 
GoRE). That has been the effect of the 
flailing efforts to push this system 
through the Congress over the past sev-
eral years. The country has been satu-
rated with & propaganda that has not 
only puzzled our own people but which 
may well have exposed the Nation to In-
ternational ridicule. First, It was urged 
that the Sentinel system be adopted on 
the grounds that it would protect Ameri-
cans against the Russians. Then, when 
It was transparent that nothing could 
protect the people of the Nation against 
massive Soviet attack, the system was 
labeled a. defense of the inhabitants of 
the cities-a thin defense--against the 
irrational Chinese. Finally, it was termed 
a. defense against both the Russians and 
the Chinese and even against accidental 
missile firings. Indeed, Is It any wonder 
that there are grave doubts, now, as to 
whether an ABM system can protect this 
Nation against anyone? 
That is another point, however, and I 
will take it up at another time. I wish to 
stress now that the system which Presi-
dent Nixon has proposed be built this 
year is for the protection of a seg-
ment of our deterrent power-350 
Minuteman missiles in Montana and 
North Dakota. That is not a protection 
against China; It is a protection of a 
small part of our capacity to retaliate 
against an attack from the Sov1et Un-
Ion. By the same token, therefore, It is 
with Russia that disarmament agree-
menta which might make possible the 
forestalling of the immensely costly 
placement of the ABM's might have rele-
vance. If, instead what Is proposed for 
this year is to cement in a plan for a 
mixed system-a polyglot ABM-to pro-
tect all of the ICBM deterrent power of 
the United States, to protect against 
China, to protect against third parties or 
to protect against accidental attacks or 
to protect against whatever, then what 
sense would It make, as It is obviously 
contemplated, to talk dlsannament with 
the Russ1ans but not with the Chinese? 
Do you disarm a defense system, Mr. 
President, against China or against acci-
dental missiles because you have negoti-
ated an arms agreement with the Soviet 
Union? 
What I am suggesting, Mr. President, 
is that it Is at least possible to find a ra-
tionale in the association of a two-site 
ABM installation and negotiations with 
the Russians on arms l!m1tation. Presi-
dent Nixon linked these two considera-
tions in shifting from the previous ABM 
concept. I fear, however, that subsequent 
interpretation by his subordinates Is rap_ 
idly dismantling the connection. To be 
sure, there is a certain ritual deference 
paid to the disarmament aspect of the 
President's approach but any perusal of 
the record to date will show that the em-
phasis has clearly shifted so that the 
two-site installations appear to be com-
Ing into focus as a mere wayside stop 
along the road to the construction of a 
great nuclear wall whose costa would be 
Incalculable. 
It seems to me, therefore, that we need 
to know whether the presumption upon 
which the Defense Department now 
seems to be acting is valid-that is, that 
an open-ended deployment of an area 
defense system aimed in any and all di-
rections is a foregone conclusion. I 
thought the President had not decided 
that point-that he had decided at this 
time only to deploy ABM's at two sites. I 
thought the President was trying to keep 
open an option which would permit him 
to restrain the costly spread of the sys-
tem at that point or even to reverse it. 
The interpretations seem 'to me, how-
ever, to be closing off that option. How 
are we to explain, otherwise, the effort 
which may well be made by the Defense 
Department to obtain approprlationa 
from the Senate, for example, to pur-
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chase land, this year, for several ABM 
sites beyond those In Montana and North 
Dakota? 
It is my understanding that last year 
Congress appropriated $227.3 million for 
acquisition of land and construction; 
tl1at is, brick and mortA.r items. It is my 
further understanding that about one-
third of that money has been spent. It is 
my further understanding that the law 
can well be interpreted so that the re-
maining two-thirds, or approximately 
$150 million, is available and spendable 
with no restrictions whatsoever because 
when the appropriation was made it was 
open ended or "no ended," however one 
wishes to refer to it. So it may well be 
tha t there will be no request for funds 
this year because of the two-thirds of 
$227.3 million appropriated for this fiscal 
year being available and ready to be 
spent. · 
Incidentally, speaking of construction, I 
wonder what is going to happen to the 
sites which have been bought in the 
vicinity of Boston, and very likely, in 
other parts of the country as well, which 
because of the change from Sentinel to 
Safeguard now no longer have the pur-
pose intended for them when the pur-
chase was originally made. These pur-
chases, beyond Montana and North 
Dakota, would have no purpose other 
than to set in motion an elaboration 
which President Nixon presumably has 
not yet decided. What justification can 
there be for appropriating or expending 
moneys ava:.lable this year for a need 
which may not exist next year? 
Indeed, the Department's request for 
this money seems to me to be presumptu-
ous of the intent that both the President 
and the Congress had in mind. 
The basic focus of this discussion on 
the ABM, then, if I may sum up, ought 
to be on what President Nixon has pro-
posed to begin to do this year: that is, 
to provide ABM's to protect 350 Minute-
man ICBM missiles in Montana and 
North Dakota while trying to move 
ahead, at the same time, with •negotia-
tions with the Russians on curbing the 
armaments competition. Whether even 
that limited ABM deployment is justified 
1s another matter. That will have to be 
considered in the light of the reliablllty, 
redundance, and the relevance of any 
ABM deployment at this time. It will 
have to be discussed in the light of the 
immense costs. actual and potential. It 
will have to be decided, finally, on the 
basis of the need to balance the require-
ments of external security against the 
requirements for halting the disintegra-
tion of the nation's internal security in 
all of its ramifications. 
I shall have more to say on this sub-
Ject, Mr. President, at a subsequent date. 
But at this time, I ask unanimous consent 
that the transcript of the President's 
news conference of March 14, published 
in the New York Times on March 15, 
1969, having to do with foreign and 
domestic affairs, be printed in the 
RECORD. 
There being no objection. the tran-
script Wa.l! ordered to be printed in the 
RECORD, as follows: 
S3129 
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